Future Armoured Troop Carrying Vehicles by Balos, Sebastian et al.
Received 23 April 2009, Revised 27 January 2010
Defence Science Journal, Vol. 60, No. 5, September 2010, pp. 483-490
Ó 2010, DESIDOC
Future Armoured Troop Carrying Vehicles
Sebastian Balos*, Vencislav Grabulov#, and Leposava Sidjanin*
*University of  Novi Sad, Novi Sad, Serbia
#Institute for Materials Testing, Belgrade, Serbia
E-mail:  sebab@uns.ac.rs
ABSTRACT
Present-day reliance on wheeled and tracked armour personnel carriers (APCs) and infantry fighting
vehicles (IFVs), may be changed in the future. Shaped charge grenades and impovised explosive devices (IEDs)
represent a considerable threat, even to well protected main battle tanks (MBTs). Paradoxically, the crew of
wheeled and tracked troop-carrying vehicles is numerically three to four times larger than that of MBTs,
however, their protection in all aspects is significantly lower. Therefore, heavier vehicles may get more attention
in the future, where sharing the chassis and a number of components with MBTs could provide significant
reductions in procurement costs and maintenance, as well as a simplified logistics in relation to the latest
tracked. Obviously, the IFVs mobility of heavy vehicles would be lower than that of lighter vehicles. However,
by applying various degrees of modular armour protection, a significant rise in strategic, operational, and
tactical mobility could be achieved. Such heavy tracked vehicles, built on a common chassis as MBTs, may
equip the future heavy brigades, which will be in contrast to the lighter wheeled vehicles included in rapid
deployment brigades. As a result, tracked personnel carrying vehicles may extinct in the future.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As is well established, there are three priorities in
main battle tanks (MBT) design: firepower, mobility, and
protection, also called the tank triangle. These priorities
were differently treated by different users, giving various
approaches in MBT design1,2. However, similar priorities
can be established in the design of other armoured vehicles,
such as armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and infantry
fighting vehicles (IFVs), as two primary types of MBT
support vehicles. Along the three priorities in MBT design,
another, equally important is the fourth, the ability of the
vehicles to carry troops, i.e., dismounting soldiers with
their equipment. As is the case with MBTs, the priorities
in APC and IFV design may vary, reflecting the specific
requirements of the particular user, such as the terrain, the
expected threat, etc3.
During the Second world war, the Cold war, and after
that, a Blitzkrieg-like doctrine of warfare relied on an intensive
attack on a small section of the enemy front, penetrating
deeply into the rear echelons. Two or more such attacks
would meet in the enemy rear, encircling other sections
of the enemy front. During these deep-penetration operations,
urban, forrested and mountainous terrains, theoretically,
would have been avoided, since in such environments,
armour formations, which would have been on the spearhead
of the attack, might become vulnerable to infantry in close-
quarter combat. However, after the end of the Cold war,
major armour operations became inceasingly less important.
In local, low-intensity conflicts, such as recent conflicts
in Lebanon, Iraq, and Afganistan, close-quarter combat
became predominant. In these operations,  large portion
of coalition casualties were the result of improvised explosive
devices (IEDs), as well as of individual, shoulder-launched
anti-armour grenades, such as the well-known Russian
RPG-74,5. These threats are very different; some IEDs are
specially detonated anti-tank mines, placed individually or
in stacks, improvised mines using artillery or mortar shells,
or even large, 100 kg class TNT devices, placed alongside
the road, or burried under the expected route of armour
formations. Improvised explosive devices, being improvised,
can have a very different effect on armoured vehicles.
Therefore, the determining of the vehicle resistance to
IEDs is not an easy task. After many years of losses in
Israel and Iraq, the first steps towards standardisation
may be done in foreseeable future. The first standardised
level of protection against IEDs may become the equivalent
of 50 kg of TNT detonated at 5 m from the vehicle, which,
the vehicle should not only survive, but be able to open
the doors or hatches. This level of protection may become
NATO STANAG level 4 and is integrated in the French
Nexter Aravis 4 · 4 multipurpose heavily protected armoured
vehicle6. On the other hand, even RPG-7 grenade launcher,
the most proliferated weapon of that type in the world,
can use different grenades, with increased penetration,
representing a serious threat to the best armoured fighting
vehicles. The penetration power can vary from the basic,
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PG-7Vs 330 mm, up to PG-7VRs over 600 mm7. Although
these penetration figures are not sufficient to penetrate
the front armour of the most modern main battle tanks,
they are more than capable to penetrate their sides, rear
or top  the areas where armoured vehicle of the future
should have a much better armour protection. However,
higher penetrating RPG-7 grenades, equipped with tandem
shaped charge, may penetrate the front of the best armoured
IFVs, such as the US M2A2 Bradley, equipped with explosive
reactive armour (ERA). This way, the destruction of the
vehicle may be hazardous not for three to four crew members
like in MBTs, but rather up to ten crew members (commander,
gunner, driver and seven dismounts). The loss of 10 soldiers
inside an IFV can affect the public opinion much more
effectively than an attack on a MBT with or without losses,
making a serious blow to the countrys willing to fight a
war any further.
Some references state that the future of armoured vehicle
protection lies in active defences, which use some kind of
munitions to effectively shoot-down the incoming projectile.
However, such systems are relatively easy to saturate and
very expensive. Therefore, the price limits active protection
application, since the new generation of tracked IFVs become
more and more expensive, rising the cost of the active defence
equipped vehicle to an unacceptable level8.
2. THE ISSUE OF COST
A typical example of post Cold war cost rise is the
Swedish CV90 family of tracked IFVs. In 2004, Finland ordered
45 CV9030 vehicles for  2.67 million per vehicle, while the
Netherlands ordered 184 CV9035 vehicles for  4,07 millions
per vehicle in 20049. The latest German Puma IFV will be
even more expensive at  7.1 millions per vehicle ($ 9.2
million), even though a realtively larger number of vehicles
is ordered, 410. Such prices, combined with the armour protection
only against the basic PG-7V does not provide a sufficient
cost-effectiveness. In turn, the vehicles gross weight of
43 t with additional armour protection, requires a logistic
footprint equal or marginally lower than that of MBTs9.
Similar protection levels can be achieved using a wheeled
armoured vehicle. While the protection against shaped-
charges is similar or slightly lower than that of the tracked
vehicles, anti-mine protection of wheeled vehicles is higher,
due to their V-shaped hulls, as well as the possibility to
leave the site after a blown wheelif a tracked vehicle hits
a mine, the track will most likely be thrown off, effectively
stopping the vehicle, placing the occupants in great danger
if targeted by shaped charge grenades. Such tactics has
been widely used in Iraq and Afghanistan10. However, wheeled
vehicles have other, fund-saving features. The first is the
cost, which is considerably lower  among the most expensive
is Patria AMV, with a price of  1.5 million ($ 1.8 million)9.
Furthermore, wheeled vehicles have a higher strategic and
operational mobility, due to their lower weight, and their
logistic footprint is much smaller, decreasing their operational
costs by around 70 per cent. An additional benefit is a
less aggressive appearance than that of a tracked vehicle,
which makes these more suitable for peacekeeping operations.
Their strategic mobility is higher, especially their air
transportability, due to their lower weight than their tracked
counterparts. As such, wheeled vehicles enjoy an increased
popularity, inspite of their lower tactical mobility due to
their higher specific ground pressure, which might achieve
a twice the value of tracked vehicles  APCs, IFVs and
MBTs11. Higher specific ground pressure limits the vehicles
mobility over soft ground such as sand or mud, however,
when operating in urban environments, this drawback is
less pronounced.
The third, the most cost-effective solution of the problem
of transporting troops is a mine-resistant ambush protected
vehicle (MRAP)-like concept, widely used particularly in
Iraq, where its natural environment is urban warfare. These
vehicles have an even lower soft ground performance than
that of 8x8 wheeled APCs and IFVs, due to their wheel
configuration of 4 · 4 and 6 · 6, but their mine and IED
protection is slightly higher12. However, their armament is
very poor, comprising only of machine guns, and their shaped-
charge protection is considerably lower than that of any
other type of armoured vehicle. As such, although useful
in specific environments, mine-resistant ambush protected
vehicles can not be considered as an effective alternative
to present-day APCs and IFVs for MBT support operations.
Therefore, neither too expensive tracked vehicles, nor
wheeled vehicles, both of which have an insufficient
survivability against, all threats, found in the hands of
terrorists or insurgents, such as IEDs and older shaped-
charge warheads in close quarter combat, can not provide
a cost-effective response to modern anti-insurgent and
anti-terrorist demands.
3. CREW PROTECTION PARADOX
The concept of IFVs appeared in the 1965, with the
Soviet BMP-1 tracked vehicle. BMP-1 was capable of not
only transporting eight dismounts in the area of oprations
like APCs, but providing them with firing ports, enabling
them to protect the vehicle with individual weapons. The
onboard armament consisted of a 73 mm gun, capable of
supporting the dismounted infantry and in addition, antitank
guided missiles were carried, capable of penetrating any
MBT at that time. As an answer, the West fielded  a number
of IFVs, such as the US M2 Bradley, the British Warrior,
and the German Marder. However, armour protection of all
these vehicles was considerably lower than that of MBTs.
All these vehicles were intended to support, not only their
dismounted infantry, but MBTs as well, even during
breakthroughs. During these operations, they would have
been faced with the best enemy anti-armour weapons, often
capable of dealing with a much better armoured MBTs.
These facts were in a strong contrast to the number of
carried troops up to 10. As a comparison, contemporary
MBTs, carried a crew of three (the Soviet) or four (the
Western MBTs). This crew-protection paradox is still present
on almost all Cold war-heritage tracked and wheeled APCs
and IFVs.
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4. HEAVY TROOP CARRIER CONCEPT
During the eighties, the crew-protection paradox of
APCs and IFVs was noticed by the Israel Defence Force,
which was faced with probably the strongest anti-tank
defences in the world on Golan heights, on the border with
Syria. Israelis never fielded IFVs, instead, cheaper APCs
were preferred. However, the US M113, although constantly
uparmoured, was never considered capable of withstanding
modern anti-armour weapons. As a result in 1983, obsolete
Centurion MBTs were withdrawn from service and modified
into heavy APCs. The turrets of MBTs were removed and
this saved weight was used to add a notable superstructure
and up-armour the vehicle from the sides, rear, and top.
The result was a series of vehicles, beginning with NagmaShot,
Nagmachon, and finally Nakpadon. The main drawback of
these vehicles was their lack of mobility and therefore,
inability to support Markava MBTs.
In 1989, a new vehicle was fielded, the Achzarit. It
was a modified T-54 or T-55 MBT, designated in Israeli
use as Tiran 5, captured from Egypt and Syria during
the 1967 six-day war. Along a much improved armour
protection (T-54/55 tank weighted 34 t, while the turretless
Achzarit 44 t), a new, more compact and more powerful
engine was used, enabling the troops to enter and leave
the vehicle through a rear door, a major improvement
in relation to Centurion-based vehicles. In addition, a
higher speed of Achzarit enabled it to support Merkava
MBTs, and this feature kept these vehicles in front-line
service even today13.
After achieving a great success with their heavy APCs
concept, Israelis fielded an ultimate vehicle of this kind,
the Namer, in 2007. This vehicle used the obviously best
choice for a modification, the Merkava MBT chassis, with
front mounted powerpack. This left place for a considerable
space in the rear for nine dismounts, but in addition, a
remote weapon station with a heavy machine gun was
mounted. A remote weapon station with 30 mm automatic
canon may be used, effectively making this vehicle a true
heavy IFV3.
Other countries followed suit, such as Jordan with
their Temsah, a Centurion-based heavy IFV and Russia
with BTR-T, a T-55 derivative. Temsah was interesting since
it was basically built on a reversed Centurion hull, allowing
a wide rear ramp. The Russians opted for a very heavily
armed IFV with a minimum changes on the tank hull, providing
a less convinient top hatches for only five dismounts13.
5. CONVERSIONS OF OBSOLETE MAIN BATTLE
TANK
The development of heavy APCs and heavy IFVs, based
on an obsolete MBT chassis, may offer an answer to the
question how to protect the personnel in the present and
future high-risk environments. The survivability of such
vehicles is considerably higher than that of the most modern
wheeled or tracked vehicles and even MBTs. These conversions
are a very convenient way of using the obsolete MBT chassis.
When an obsolete MBT is withdrawn from service, the
cutting and recycling costs are slighlty more than selling
the steel that is received from rendering of one MBT14. The
donation of obsolete MBTs may give an answer to the
problem of cost of cutting and recycling, but leaves the
armed forces with a need for an APC or an IFV.
5.1 Issue of Mobility
However, conversions of obsolete MBT chassis into
any kind of dismount carrying vehicle, intended for modern
MBTs support, posseses some crucial limitations. The most
important limitation is the mobility of a converted vehicle.
Modern MBTs posess a higher maximum and rough terrain
speed than obsolete tanks. For example, maximum speed
of M1A2 Abrams MBT is 67 km/h, while cross-country
speed is 48 km/h15. On the other hand, the same figures
for the now obsolete M60 MBT16 are 48 km/h and only
14.5 km/h. Therefore, if the turret of M60 is removed and
the same weight is used for up-armouring, to bring the
armour level to a similar level as that of M1A2, the converted
vehicle will not possess the same mobility as the obsolete
MBT. Installing a more powerful engine may partially solve
the problem of mobility, but this rises other issues, such
as the need for a new transmission and suspension, rising
the conversion cost. This becomes increasingly challenging,
since a rear ramp or doors are an absolute priority for
providing the dismounts a safe and a relatively quick means
of entering and leaving the vehicle. Therefore, converted
vehicles may, in the future, be much more attractive as
engineering vehicles, especially for mine-clearing operations,
or clearing of IEDs. These operations do not require close
interoperability with modern MBTs, but a high level of
armour protection is still important. Currently, there are
two vehicles intended to fulfill this role, the Israeli Puma13,
based on Centurion MBT hull and the Serbian Munja,
based on T-55 MBT17.
5.1.1  Costs
Although informations about the cost of such conversions
are scarce18, converting the ubiquites T-55 MBT, now largely
obsolete, into the above mentioned heavy IFV BTR-T was
$ 600,000 in 1997. This price, with inflation included would
now most probably rise to $ 900,0001,000,000. However,
it is still considerably lower than that of contemporary
IFVs, with a similar armament of a 25-30 mm autocannon.
However, BTR-T transports only five, instead of six to
eight dismounts, which is standard today. Another drawback
is the lack of rear doors or ramp, a standard feature of other
specialised vehicles. The dismounts leave the vehicle through
roof hatches, a much slower and less safe process. On the
other hand, the Ukrainian BTR-55, based on a reversed T-
55 chasis with a new engine, explosive reactive armour
(ERA) and remotely controlled machine gun costs only
around $ 150,00019.
6. MODERN MAIN BATTLE TANK CONVERSION
The development of heavy APCs and heavy IFVs on
a modern MBT chassis has a number of advantages versus
the conversion of obsolete MBTs. As is well known, the
cost of new MBTs has risen in the past decade. For example,
the cost of US M1A1 Abrams MBT rose more than double,
from 1999 to 2006. In 1999, the cost of a single unit was
$ 4.3 million20, while seven years later, built for Australia,
has had a single unit price of $ 9.3 million ($ 550 million
for 59 units)21. The similar price has been quoted for the
latest and most capable up-armoured German Leopard 2
versions. 170 Leopard 2A6HEL, along with armoured recovery
vehicles, armoured vehicle-launched bridges, driving and
shooting simulators, had an overall cost of  1.7 billion22.
Compared to the latest German Puma IFV, these prices are
very attractive, knowing the price structure of a typical
MBT components. According to Way23, the cost of the fire
control system of the French Leclerc MBT is 22 per cent
of the vehicle cost. Similarly, the component cost of the
US M1A1 Abrams, according to the same reference is as
follows:
 armoured hull 9.1 per cent,
 suspension 7.8 per cent,
 engine and transmission 32.8 per cent,
 auxiliary systems 7.1 per cent,
 turret 16.6 per cent,
 fire control system 21.3, and
 other systems 5.3 per cent. (Fig. 1).
From these figures, it can be noted that although
Leclerc possesses a panoramic commander sight, not present
on M1A1, the cost of the fire control system is almost the
same in relation to the price of the MBT. Obviously, an
IFV, based on the common hull with a MBT, would lack
of the MBT total cost. Therefore, it may be assumed that
the hull, with all its components, needed for an IFV based
on a modern MBT chassis would cost between $ 6.2 million
and $ 6.8 million. These figures are both, $ 2.4-3.0 million
lower than that of the German Puma IFV. This difference
in cost may be used for additional armour protection as
well as a remote weapon station, armed with a 25-30 mm
autocannon and antitank-guided missiles, enabling this
hypothetic vehicle to become a true IFV in firepower aspect
as well. Infantrymen would have obviously been placed
inside the turet ring, of the diameter of almost 2 m, providing
enough space for at least eight dismounts. This space is
larger than that of older MBTs, as well as of the German
Puma IFV, that carries only six dismounts. As a result, such
a vehicle would have a much better armour protection than
that of Puma IFV, even when Puma is fitted with additional
armour protection, against all threats, especially from the
front. Therefore, a converted IFV, based on a modern MBT
chasis would provide a much safer transport for troops,
particularly in urban areas where insurgent and terrorist
groups operate.
However, it is highly unlikely that any ground forces
would invest into an IFV based on most modern MBTs.
One of the reasons is the rear engine and transmission
compartment, existant on a vast majority of MBTs. This
compartment completely blocks the rear of the hull, preventing
the existance of a rear door or ramp. This does not allow
a rear enter or exit for the dismounts, a standard solution,
that has been used on all tracked vehicles of this type.
As a result, a new, narrower powerpack is needed, which
increases the costs.
However, if this matter is more closely analysed, it can
be found that for example, Israeli Merkava MBT, that entered
service in 1978, having a front-mounted engine (among
other reasons, for additional protection), provided and
still provides in its latest Mk 4 version, a rear door. This
door is used, not only for a relatively safe enter and exit
for crew members in case of disabling the MBT, but for
additional ammunition for the main gun. Furthermore, in
the most hazardous areas, up to six dismounts may be
carried in the rear underarmour space, as well as few strechers
for wounded troops, obviously, with the maximum possible
armour protection24. Although Merkava has never been
intended to be a specialised dual-role vehicle, but rather
a MBT with additional, very useful roles, it has shown the
potential of the idea of matching two kinds of armoured
vehicle, unimaginable until recently. As a result, Namer
APC uses slightly modified chassis of Merkava 4 MBT.
Instead of converting older versions of Merkava, Israelis
opted for building new vehicles. The cost of this vehicle
is expected to be only $ 1.5 million, which is much lower
than any modern IFV25,26. This is the result of a low-cost
remote-controlled weapon station armed with a heavy machine
gun, obviously, of a much lower firepower than that of an
autocannon, used on IFVs27. However, Namer has armour
protection similar to that of Merkava 4, much higher than
any other IFV.
these expensive feature, as well as the turret with all the
systems included, mainly the gun. In case of M1A1, these
two components together cost 37.9 per cent of the MBTs
unit price22.
Although the individual component cost of the Leopard 2A6
is not known, it may be assumed that the turret and fire
control system combined cost reaches a similar percentage
%
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Figure 1. M1A1 Abrams price structure23.
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7. COMMON CHASIS
The most effective common chassis, used for both
MBT as well as an IFV, would have been envisaged from
the beginning of the design process. This approach has
been used by the US designers at the end of the eighties,
in the form of armoured family of vehicles, or more specifically,
heavy chassis28,29. Heavy chassis FV-1 would have been
used for a MBT, designated as Block III, intended to be
the follow-on to the M1/M1A1 Abrams (Future Armored
Combat System  FACS); FV-2 as an IFV, intended as a
replacement for M2 Bradley, while other vehicles from this
family would have included Sapper Vehicle (SV), Future
Reconnaissance Vehicle (FRV), Directed Energy Weapon
Vehicle (DEW-V), Fire Support Team and Combat Observation
Lazing System (FS/COLS), Armored Ambulance (AA) and
Command Group (CG) vehicles. FV-3 would include line-
of-sight antitank Kinetic-Energy Missile Vehicle (KEM-V),
line-of-sight, forward, heavy Air Defence Vehicle (LOS-
AD). FV-8 would have been Recovery Variant (RV), while
FV-5 would have been the Advanced Field Artillery System,
Cannon (AFAS-C). FV-10 would have been the armoured
bridgelayer or Combat Gap Crosser (CGC). FV-11 included
the Combat Mobility Vehicle (CMV) and the Combat Earth
Mover (CEM). Such an ambitious programme, with a number
of planned vehicles with totally new advanced components,
at the end of the Cold War could not provide wider support,
and it was cancelled in 1991. However, if this programme
is evaluated from the perspective of present needs, more
specifically, the need for a higher degree of IED and shaped
charge (RPG-7) protection, not only from the frontal aspect,
but from the side, rear and top, armored family of vehicles
may be an attractive starting point for a future family of
heavy armoured fighting vehicles. To stay within the topic
of this paper, MBT and heavy APC or IFV of the future
may be based on a common chassis.
7.1 Protection Paradox Resolved
Using the common chassis, the protection of IFV would
be the same, or even better than that of a MBT, since the
turret could have been replaced with a considerably lighter
remote weapon station. Even if the protection would have
stayed the same, present needs for protection may, in the
majority of cases, be fulfilled. Future needs, for an all
aspect protection against most modern anti-armour weapons
should be satisfied by additional armour panels. The turret
of the US M1A2 MBT, has a weight of 23 t, leaving the
weight of the hull at 40 t. Therefore, over 20 t, left after
the remote weapon station is installed, may be used for
additional armour protection at the sides, bottom, top, and
to a smaller extent, the rear. This distribution does not
affect the centre of gravity of the vehicle, so the fitting
of such heavy additional protection should be straightforward.
Two or three crew members of an APC, as well as eight
to ten dismounts, so from 10 to 13 soldiers would have
a higher degree of protection than three to four crew members
of MBTs. This way, by increasing the protection of the
vehicle that carries more people, the protection paradox
would not exist anymore.
The most attractive concept for protecting the vehicles
may be modular armour protection. Future heavy APCs,
IFVs and future MBTs would have been fitted with various
levels of additional armour protection modules. This way,
a basic, relatively lightly armoured vehicle, may be adapted
to various, specific threats. The basic additional protection
level would provide all-aspect protection against PG-7V
grenades of the well known RPG-7, to a higher level of
PG-7VR grenades, for urban and anti-insurgents operations.
The highest level of protection may protect the vehicles
from armour piercing fin stabilised discarding sabot rounds
(APFSDS) and the most effective antitank guided weapons
(missiles) from the front, allowing typical mechanised warfare
missions, against enemy MBTs and a strong, organised
antitank defences. Roof and floor modular armour may be
added against state-of-the-art top attack antitank missiles
and antitank mines, respectively. This way, the resulting
common chassis, with modular armour, used for future
MBTs and amoured personnel carriers, as well as IFVs,
may have interesting implications on mobility.
7.2 Mobility of Military Vehicles
7.2.1  Strategic Mobility
The mobility of military vehicles has different connotations
as its nature varies with the scope or scale of operations,
which results in more than one kind or level of it. There
are three clearly identifiable kinds or levels of mobility:
strategic, operational, and tactical. Strategic mobility involves
considerable distances and is not executed by vehicles
own power. In most cases it is done by rail, ships and air.
Generally, as the vehicle is lighter, its strategic mobility
is higher, but, the differences, if transported by air and
road, are higher. Transporting armoured vehicles by cargo
aircraft is the fastest, so it is very popular in the force
projection concept of operations, but the most expensive.
However, this way of transport is of limited value when
heavy vehicles, such as MBTs should be moved to great
distances. As an example, one US heavy transport aircraft,
such as C-17 Globemaster III, can carry only one 63 t MBT
like M1A2 Abrams. Alterantively, the aircraft can transport
two classic 30 t up-armoured M2A3 Bradley IFVs, or four
M1126 Stryker wheeled APCs. Therefore, compared to a
heavy IFV of roughly the same weight as MBTs, both
classic tracked and wheeled vehicles of the same kind
have a considerable advantage30. However, by adopting
modular armour protection, the weight of the stripped-off
vehicle would allow the transport of more vehicles in one
cargo aircraft. Armour modules may be transported in separate
airplanes, alowing the equipping the transported vehicles
in the field. Nevertheless, transport by air is the privilege
of world powers, while other nations rely on road transport
by specialised trucks. Modularity of armour protection will
be beneficial in this case as well. If rail or more importantly,
ship transport is considered, the physical dimensions of
the vehicles are more important than their weight, so the
advantage of lighter vehicles is minimal, due to a much
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smaller differences in dimensions in relation to heavier
vehicles.
7.2.2  Operational Mobility
Operational mobility implies the ability of vehicles to
move in the zone of operations. This is the matter of vehicles
moving under their own power, mainly on roads, but often
also cross-country. Therefore, the speed with which these
can do this depends primarily on their power-to-weight
ratio. This ratio of heavy APCs and heavy IFVs is rougly
the same as that of classic tracked vehicles of lower weight.
Wheeled vehicles have an important advantage over both
standard and heavy troop-carrying vehicles due to their
higher road speed. However, off-road, wheeled vehicles
have some limitations, especially on soft ground. On the
other hand, weight can have an adverse effect by restricting
the number of road bridges that armoured vehicles can
use. However, a classic APC or IFV, having a limited armament
and armour is of little value if faced with a competent and
well-equipped enemy, so in most occasions, MBTs must
be brought into action, with their weight penalty.
7.2.3  Tactical Battlefield Mobility
The third level of mobility is tactical, or battlefield mobility.
This level of mobility is the ability to move when in actual
imminent contact with enemy forces. It involves movement
over various types of terrain, the most difficult being soft
soil and negotiating natural and man- made obstacles. Heavier
vehicles generally have a higher specific ground pressure,
so their soft-ground performance is lower than that of lighter
tracked vehicles. However, this can be avoided by stripping
off the additional armour protection of heavy APCs and heavy
IFVs, making these as well armoured as the MBTs. This level
of protection is still considerably higher than that of classic
wheeled and tracked vehicles of this kind.
Wheeled vehicles are handicapped in tactical mobility,
since they do not have tracks to effectively spread their
weight over a larger area, giving a much higher specific
ground pressure. Being in contact with the enemy, armoured
vehicles can not avoid being under fire, so armour protection
is of crucial importance. If the armour is immune to all or
the majority of enemy weapons, the tactical mobility of the
vehicle is higher.
And finally, the last aspect of tactical mobility is the
endurance, or how long can the vehicle operate, before
these have to be refuelled. Although heavyer tracked vehicles
consume more fuel than lighter ones, their fuel capacity is
higher, so their endurance is the same. On the other hand,
wheeled vehicles have a smaller rolling resistance, so their
fuel consumption is unproportionally lower, giving a higher
endurance. The endurance can be increased by using hybrid
engines (combined diesel-electric) with a lower fuel consumption,
but this technology is still at the experimental level31.
7.3 Costs and Logistics
Common chassis for MBTs and heavy APCs or heavy
IFVs, may give many logistic simplifications and cost reductions.
This way, two vehicles that the whole armoured force would
have relied on, share the same engine, transmission, the
whole suspension system, as well as a large portion of
armour components, such as non-metallic inserts, type of
armour steel, fire extinguishing system, hatches, periscopes,
seats, drivers instrument panels and the whole driver area
in general, etc. With such concept, many cost reductions
can be made, not only in procurement costs, but in maintenance
and training as well.
The reduction of procuring cost is obvious, due to
a large number of components that are shared, increasing
the production, and at the same time, lowering the cost
of the individual component. This is done through spreading
the research and development costs on more units produced,
lowering not only the cost of the heavy IFV, but the MBT
as well. Logistics would have been largely simplified, since
the servicing procedured and spare parts of automotive
components would have been identical. This implies the
use of the same recovering and repairing vehicles. It is
in contrast to present-day fleet, where two different vehicles
of the same type are used for repairing and recovering of
MBTs and classic APCs or IFVs. In case of the US M1
Abrams MBTs and accompanying M2 Bradley IFVs, even
the welding rods used in production and damage repair
are different, since their hulls are made of armour steel and
aluminium alloy, respectively. Driver training would have
been the same, using common simulators and driving training
vehicles. The only problem would have been a higher fuel
consumption, compared to other, lighter tracked vehicles.
However, the latest tracked IFVs became considerably heavier
than the vehicles of the same type during the Cold war.
Their weight reached 43 t in case of the German Puma,
which, combined with a state-of-the-art powerpack, provides
a relatively low-fuel consumption. Using the same generation
of advanced diesel engines, the fuel consumption may be
kept at an acceptable level. By adoption of hybrid powerpack,
fuel consumption may be further brought down31.
8. CONCLUSIONS
According to the results of the analysis presented in
this paper, the future of tracked personnel carrying vehicles,
such as APCs and IFVs lies in vehicles that share the same
chassis with MBTs. Although there are some negative
implications regarding air and road transportability, the
advantages outweigh the drawbacks.
 First, armour protection may be even higher than that
of MBTs, giving the highest possible immunity facing
the enemy anti-armour weapons to the crew and dismounts,
lowering the possible losses.
 Second, the interoperability with MBTs is the highest
possible as well.
 And the third, procurement and maintenance costs
are lowered due to a number of common components
with MBTs.
Therefore, classic, specially designed tracked APCs
and IFVs may simply extinct. For equipping heavy brigades,
heavy APCs and IFVs may replace classic vehicles of the
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same type. On the other hand, for equipping light, rapid
deployment brigades, wheeled vehicles offer lower weight,
cost, and maintenance, while keeping the same level of
armour protection as classic tracked troop-carrying vehicles.
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